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Chapter pages in book: (p. 23 - 27)the 1940 labor force concept (see Tables 1 and 2)The adjustments
are sometimes big for individual age-sex groups, but most of them
offset one another in the over-all classification'8 and do little to
explain the 1940 drop in labor force percentages of the male age
groups 25-44 and 45-64, and of female groups below 20 and over
64 (Table 2). Much of the decline for the middle-age groups might,
it is true, be explained plausibly in terms of relief and higher em-
ployability standards; but at least some may reflect an undercount by
the 1940 census. As mentioned earlier, this partial explanation is
suggested by the WPA poii data.
4 THE LABOR FORCE IN PEACETIME
The outstanding peacetime characteristic of the labor force isits
stability of size relative to the population. Gainful worker propensi-
ties computed from decennial censuses have deviated remarkably
little from certain trends noted in comparable age and sex groups.
These trends themselves have been influenced by rather obvious
factors: the rising school attendance; the postponing of the date of
marriage; the decline in the average number of children a woman
must care for; the easing of household burdens; and the develop-
ment of insurance, pensions, and charity for the aged. All this was
commented on when we discussed the decennial census figures. Three
of the four censuses (1910-30) were, it is true, taken at times of
rather high cyclical activity. Periods of low activity are not, how-
ever, unrepresented. The 1930 census was taken on the downgrade
of a cycle, and the 1940 census was. taken at a time of considerable
unemployment and of far from full utilization of the pro-
ductive potential.
As already admitted, the labor force propensity in April 1940
seems a little low compared with propensities at preceding censuses,
though not so much lower as the over-all propensities might lead us
to believe or when measured by the poii estimate. The big rises in
school enrollment percentages as well as in old age benefit pay-
ments in preceding years explain most of the below-trend drop in
the labor force propensities of young and old.19 The remaining,
17 Discussion of these adjustments must be reserved for later publication.
18 There is a large net over-all adjustment but it is the effect of the 1,400,000 adjust-
ment for the 1910 census overcount of child and women workers, not of a net adjust-
ment for definitions.
19 The rises, of course, may have been in part the political and social consequences of
the drop in labor force propensities.
(23)unexplained, drop is most noticeable in the propensities of males
25-54, because no long-run change in trend is expected for this
group. Indeed its propensities may help explain the excess of the poii
estimate over the census count.
PERCENTAGE OF MALES 25-54 IN THE LABOR FORCE
April 1930, census 97.2
°April 1940, census 94.1
monthly poll 95.1
April 1941, monthly poll 96.5
For the lower labor force percentages in April 1940 than in the
earlier occupational censuses three reasons can be offered: the change
from the definition of gainful worker; possibly inadequate field work
in the 1940 census; the small demand for labor and the resulting
high labor standards of business firms, coupled with an unprecedent-
edly generous system of home relief. The percentage of the monthly
poll, it will be noticed, was above that of the 1940 census but below
that of the 1930 census. This middle position suggests that all three
reasons may contain some truth.
On the whole, the unexplained decline is not large. Though it
does make one a bit apprehensive about the depressing effects a
severe economic collapse might have on labor force propensities, it is
not large enough to prevent the conclusion that the propensities evi-
dent in the censuses seem highly insensitive to ordinary random or
cyclical influences.
The monthly poil estimates from April 1940 through 1941, which
marked the end of peace for the United States, seem to reflect the
same insensitivity as the census enumerations. But they offer another
service. The drop in unemployment indicated by them furnishes a
test of the existence, in 1940, of additional work seekers or what
I have called the unemployed (see note 5). Unemploy-
ment was surely greater at the 1940 census than at any other occu-
pational census, at least since 1900. It is often urged that the idleness
of primary workers brings into the labor force these psychic work
seekers. If any were in the labor force of April 1940, however, the
subsequent fall in unemployment ought to have induced a corre-
sponding fall in the percentage of persons, especially women, who
claimed labor force membership.
Yet Table 4 indicates nothing of the kind. Unemployment as
a percentage of population declined greatly from 1940 to 1941.
Monthly estimates of the labor force propensity fluctuated inappreci-
ably, and the labor force propensity of the two sexes combined
[24)TABLE 4
Changes in Labor Force Propensity Associated with Changes in
the Percentage of Unemployed, United States, 1940-1941
% OF POPULATION 10 AND OLDER1940 1941 CHANGE
In labor force 50.5 50.9 +•4
Male 76.3 77.5 +1.2
Female 24.6 24.4 —.2
Unemployed 7.7 5.1 —2.6
April-September averages computed from data in Appendix B and the Labor Force
Bdletin (Bureau of the Census), March and April 1943. The Census Bureau is now
revising its 1940-43 monthly employment and unemployment estimates to conform to a
change in sampling method beginning November 1943 (The Labor Force, Feb. 2, 1944,
p. 1). These revisions will have theeffect of raising somewhat the labor force estimate
for females. They are not likely, however, to alter appreciably the significance of this
table.
shows virtually no change.2° However, the percentage of females
fell very slightly as the total unemployed percentage fell heavily.
One has a choice of interpretations for this decline in the female
labor force propensity. To begin with, it is doubtful that the p011
estimates are exact within the limits of the small change. How-
ever that may be, the fall may represent the exit of a few secondary
workers as primary workers got jobs. It is more likely, however, that
in the early period of the Selective Service Act the threat to draft
husbands caused some women to leave, or refrain from entering,
the labor force in order to establish a dependency case for defer-
ment. Whatever the interpretation, the teststill be said to show
that, despite the large unemployment, there were an insignificant
number of additional workers in the labor force in 1940.21
20 In the face of the possible argument that induction may have amounted to the same
thing as unemployment, so far as keeping women from leaving the labor force is con-
cerned, the armed forces have been added into the labor force figures of 1940 and 1941.
However, the increase in the armed forces was only one-third of the drop in the un-
employed, so that the argument, even if sound, would have no great practical impor-
tance. A further comparison with 1942 data would show marked increases in labor force
propensity accompanying the further decline in unemployment. But the comparison
would not be significant, because of the marked effect exercised by the draft.
21 John D. Durand writes: "It seems to me that a more convincing test of this hypo-
thesis can be made by examining our family tabulations, which show the proportions of
married women reported as employed, unemployed, and not in the labor force, in rela-
tion to the employment status of their husbands. If there were many 'additional workers'
counted...inthe labor force, one would expect the proportion in the labor force
and particularly the proportion unemployed to be higher for the wives of unemployed
men than for the wives of employed men. However, within specific age groups our fig-
ures show no particular differences between the employment status distributions for
the wives of employed and unemployed men, though they do show a much larger per-
centage in the labor force for wives of men not in the labor force than for wives of
either employed or unemployed men. The figures to which I refer will appear in a bul-
letin entitled The Labor Force—Sample Statistics, Employment and Family Character-
istics of Women, which we hope to receive from the Government Printing
shortly."
[25)In a deep depression year, such as 1932,itis conceivable, of course,
that the gross (psychological) labor force would exceed the net
(productive) labor force. But the chances are that if no such excess
(psychic unemployment) existed in 1940, it did not exist in the more
normal years. covered by preceding censuses.
The over-all labor force propensity seems no more sensitive to
the events of the seasons. than to cyclical or random fluctuations in
income and employment, except, of course, for the definite seasonal
in the labor force participation of school-age boys and girls. To be
sure, some seasonal variation—in this case, a winter decline—is
noticeable for females over 24 and for males over 54. From April
1940 to March 1941, before the draft began to impinge seriously
on the labor market, monthly deviations from the 12-month average
were noted for some age-sex groups. Maximum deviations (March
1941) for males and females 25 and older, however, were only
about I per cent of each group, involving together perhaps three-
quarters of a million persons.
School-age boys and girls naturally crowd into the labor force
during the summer vacation months, May through September. This
movement does not constitute a change in labor force propensity.
It is simply a seasonal shift from the school-attending group, which
has a low labor force propensity, to the non-school-attending group,
which has a high propensity. Even during the school year the labor
force percentages of school-age persons varied, and, slight as they
were, these variations must be regarded as real seasonal fluctuations
in propensity. During the winter of 1940-4 1the propensities of
males and females under 25 were six-tenths of 1 per cent (of the
population of that age group) below the average propensity for
the school year. About 200,000 young persons may b.e said to have
left the labor force.
Altogether, the maximum of the labor force propensity
from the 12-month average involved fewer than a million males. and
females of all ages,22 less than 1 per cent of the working-age popu-
lation and less than 2 per cent of the average labor force. If the poll
estimates are reliable, they suggest a rather stable labor force pro-
pensity from season to season, especially for adults. Indeed the
seasonal stability is much greater than could have been established
a priori from the mere presumption that most men are obliged to
work the year round and that most women work at occupations un-
affected by the weather.
22Excludinglabor force variations of persons under 25fromMay through September.
[26)It must not be overlooked, of course, that the labor force data
studied in this section are spotty or cover only a short period, and to
some extent are stable as the result of census definition. Nevertheless
the propensity to be 'in the labor force' seems one of the most stable
elements in the labor market, varying hardly at all except in long,
slow trends, requiring years to consummate. It may be that the
peacetime propensity is based not upon mere impulse, but upon
deeply rooted habits, on the size and composition of families, on
institutions of child care, education, and old age dependency, on the
concentration of population, and on the structure and geography of
industry. The labor force evidently does not expand or shrink under
ordinary economic pressures. If that is correct, one enters the study
of wartime activity at least alive to the difficulties of manipulating
the civilian labor force.
5THE LABOR FORCE BEFORE WORLD WAR I AND H
In 1941. the American labor force was, of course, bigger than in 1917.
It also contained relatively fewer males and relatively more older
people (Table 5). These differences sprang not only from changes
in the size and composition of the population, but also from certain
TABLE 5
Populationand the Labor Force, by Age Groups and Sex
United States, October 1916 and 1941
October1916 October 1941 *
POPULATION LABOR FORCEPOP. IN POPULATION LABOR FORCEPOP. IN
AGE % of % of LABOR % of % ofLABOR
GROUP (000)total(000)totalFORCE (000)total(000)wtalPORCE
MALE
10.24 14,33617.9 7,70919.053.8 17,80215.9 8,30014.846.6
25-44 16,06820.115,60238.497.1 19,94017.819,40034.797.3
45-64 8,39510.5 7,75019.192.3 13,66012.212,40022.290.8
65 & older 2,326 2.9 1,345 3.357.8 4,542 4.1 2,100 3.846.2
10 & older41,12651.532,40679.778.8 55,94450.042,20075.575.4
FPMALR
10.24 14,36518.0 3.532 8.724.6 17,71115.8 4,700 8.426.5
25.44 18.6 3,376 8.322.7 20,38618.2 6,10010.929.9
45 & older 9,55712.0 1,336 3.314.0 17,91816.0 2,900 5.216.2
10 & older38,79648,5 8,24320.321.2 56,01550.013,70024.524.5
MALE AND FEMALE
10.44 59,64374.630,21974.350.7 75,83967.738,50068.850.8
45 & older20,27825.410,43125.751.4 36,12032.317,40031.248.2
10 & older79,922100.040,649100.050.9 111,959100.055,900100.049.9
SOURCE: U.S. Census. For details and my interpolations of Census population and labor
force data see Appendices A and B. See also Table 1, note 1.
note to Table 4. The revisions may change the age distribution of this table some-
what. It is likely that they will increase the number of women in the labor force in
October 1941 by something less than a million, for the tentative revisions have resulted
in an increase for December 1941 of 800,000.
[27]